Jordan gay rights

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) individuals in Jordan face legal challenges and discrimination not experienced by non-LGBTQ persons. Same-sex sexual activity was illegal in Jordan under the British Mandate Criminal Code Ordinance (No. 74 of ) until when Jordan drafted its own penal code which did not criminalise. LGBT Rights in Jordan: homosexuality, gay marriage, gay adoption, serving in the military, sexual orientation discrimination protection, changing legal gender, donating blood, age of consent, and more.

What are gay rights in Jordan like? Society may be ultra-conservative, but unlike most other Arab countries, the LGBTQ laws of Jordan are less severe. For example, Jordan got rid of its anti-gay laws back in (that's long before the USA in , and the UK in ). Same-sex sexual conduct is decriminalised by the Penal code in Jordan since , with equal age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual sex. Islamic Sharia law prohibits same-sex sexual conduct and relationships, but no fines or other penalties can be enforced under criminal law.

Jordan removed legal punishments for same-gender relationships nearly two decades before the UK decriminalised consensual gay male intercourse. But day-to-day life for LGBTQ people in the country isn't easy. Nora B reports. Jordan is one of the few Middle Eastern countries where consensual same-sex sexual acts are not criminalised. Such religious rulings are not legally binding, but the General Iftaa Department acts in an advisory capacity to government branches and courts.

Meanwhile, OutRight International reports that surveys show low public acceptance of homosexuality in Jordan. In both and , a Lebanese band with queer members was banned from performing in Jordan. The blockage has been confirmed and documented by digital rights organizations Access Now and Qurium , while OONI data shows that the block remains ongoing on some networks in Jordan. Hate speech, threats against members of the LGBTQ community, and anti-LGBTQ rhetoric have reportedly exploded on social media and leading media platforms, leading to some members of the community to be detained or called in for questioning.

The report states:. Taking place between online and in-person spaces, these attacks seem to be part of a coordinated effort by governmental entities, media organizations, and conservative politicians, leaders, and individuals acting via social media and in everyday interactions. In this publication, Al Taj argued that this app is in violation of the principles, rules, and ethics of Jordanian society, stating that their sources confirmed that the government would block access to the app within days.

On 10th August , Al Taj published an article on the blocking of Grindr , claiming that the authorities in Jordan blocked access to the app following the publication of their investigation in early July Since , the Open Observatory of Network Interference OONI has developed free and open source software called OONI Probe which is designed to measure various forms of internet censorship , including the blocking of websites and apps.

Every month, OONI Probe is regularly run by volunteers in around countries including Jordan , and network measurements collected by OONI Probe users are automatically published as open data in real-time. The main question we attempted to answer was whether OONI data provides signals of Grindr blocking in Jordan during the reported dates.

We also aimed to examine whether we see signals of Grindr blocking on different networks in Jordan, and to characterize the potential blocks i. Generally, OONI Probe includes the Web Connectivity experiment which is designed to measure the blocking of many different websites including Grindr domains. The above steps are automatically performed from both the local network of the user, and from a control vantage point.

If the results from both networks are the same, the tested URL is annotated as accessible. Anomalous measurements may be indicative of blocking, but false positives can occur. We therefore consider that the likelihood of blocking is greater if the overall volume of anomalous measurements is high in comparison to the overall measurement count compared on an ASN level within the same date range for each OONI Probe experiment type.

Each Web Connectivity measurement provides further network information such as information pertaining to TLS handshakes that helps with evaluating whether an anomalous measurement presents signs of blocking. We therefore disaggregate based on the reasons that caused the anomaly e. While this method enables us to automatically confirm website blocking in numerous countries such as Indonesia , Russia , and Iran , in other countries like Jordan where ISPs appear to implement censorship using different techniques , we analyze anomalous OONI measurements with our OONI data analysis tool.

is gay marriage legal in jordan

We also analyzed the network information from TLS handshake data in these measurements to evaluate whether the errors were a result of TLS based interference. The following chart aggregates OONI measurement coverage from the testing of www.

In the above chart, successful measurements showing that www. As is evident, the testing of www. The timing of the anomalies coincides with the timing that Al Taj reported on the blocking of Grindr, as well as with the timing that this was reported to OONI by their community. The fact that most measurements thereafter continued to present anomalies provides a further signal of Grindr blocking, while suggesting that the block remains ongoing.

A per-network breakdown of the measurement coverage shows that the testing of www. However, the overall limited measurement coverage presents an important limitation in our ability to track the specific timing when the block started on each network. Most OONI measurements from the testing of endpoints cdns. This is illustrated through the following chart, which aggregates OONI measurement coverage from the testing of Grindr endpoints in Jordan between 1st August to 12th September It is necessary to inspect the network measurement data to understand why these anomalies occurred.